Law as a means

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dc.contributor.author Green, Leslie
dc.date.issued 2009-12-14
dc.identifier.citation Green, L. (2009). Law as a means. A 'Primera trobada Oxford-Girona de Filosofia del Dret'. Girona: Universitat. [Consulta 25 gener 2010]. Disponible a: http://hdl.handle.net/10256.1/1470
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10256.1/1470
dc.description.abstract This article defends legal instrumentalism, i.e. the thesis that law is distinguished among social institutions more by the means by which it serves its ends, than by the ends it serves. In Kelsen's terms, '[L]aw is a means, a specific social means, not an end.' The defence is indirect. First, it is argued that the instrumentalist thesis is an interpretation of a broader view about law that is common ground among theorists as different as Aquinas and Bentham. Second, the following familiar fallacies that seem to stand in the way of accepting the thesis are refuted: (1) If law is an instrument, then law can have no non-instrumental value. (2) If law is an instrument, then law always has instrumental value. (3) For law to be an instrument, there must be generic end that law serves. (4) If law is an instrument, law must be a neutral instrument. These claims are all wrong. In passing, the instrumentalist thesis is distinguished from other, unrelated, views sometimes associated with instrumentalism, including Brian Tamanaha's diagnosis of the vices of American law, and the views of those who think that jurisprudence is an instrument in the service of social ends
dc.format.mimetype audio/mpeg
dc.format.mimetype video/x-ms-wmv
dc.format.mimetype video/H263
dc.language.iso eng
dc.publisher Grup de Recerca en Filosofia del Dret
dc.relation.ispartofseries Primera trobada Oxford-Girona de Filosofia del Dret
dc.rights Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència Creative Commons: Reconeixement - No comercial - Compartir igual (by-nc-sa)
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/es/deed.ca
dc.subject Dret -- Filosofia -- Congressos
dc.subject Law -- Philosophy -- Congresses
dc.title Law as a means
dc.type info:eu-repo/semantics/lecture


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