http://hdl.handle.net/10256.1/1411 2025-12-14T02:45:33Z 2025-12-14T02:45:33Z Duarte d'Almeida, Luis http://hdl.handle.net/10256.1/1473 2024-09-18T07:29:54Z 2009-12-15T00:00:00Z

Some false problems in the analysis of statements Duarte d'Almeida, Luis Conferència de Luis Duarte d'Almeida, professor d'Oxford University, emmarcada dins la Primera Trobada Oxford-Girona de Filosofia del Dret

2009-12-15T00:00:00Z Dolcetti, Andrea http://hdl.handle.net/10256.1/1472 2024-09-18T07:29:54Z 2009-12-15T00:00:00Z

Sovereignty and continuity of law Dolcetti, Andrea Conferència d'Andrea Dolcetti, d'Oxford University, emmarcada dins la Primera Trobada Oxford-Girona de Filosofia del Dret

2009-12-15T00:00:00Z Gardner, John http://hdl.handle.net/10256.1/1471 2024-09-18T07:29:54Z 2009-12-14T00:00:00Z

Can there be a written constitution? Gardner, John The existence of unwritten constitutions, such as that of the UK, strikes some as puzzling. However the existence of unwritten constitutions turns out to be easier to explain than the existence of written constitutions, such as that of the US. In this [conference] I explore, and attempt to answer, some tricky conceptual questions thrown up by written constitutions

2009-12-14T00:00:00Z Green, Leslie http://hdl.handle.net/10256.1/1470 2024-09-18T07:29:54Z 2009-12-14T00:00:00Z

Law as a means Green, Leslie This article defends legal instrumentalism, i.e. the thesis that law is distinguished among social institutions more by the means by which it serves its ends, than by the ends it serves. In Kelsen's terms, '[L]aw is a means, a specific social means, not an end.' The defence is indirect. First, it is argued that the instrumentalist thesis is an interpretation of a broader view about law that is common ground among theorists as different as Aquinas and Bentham. Second, the following familiar fallacies that seem to stand in the way of accepting the thesis are refuted: (1) If law is an instrument, then law can have no non-instrumental value. (2) If law is an instrument, then law always has instrumental value. (3) For law to be an instrument, there must be generic end that law serves. (4) If law is an instrument, law must be a neutral instrument. These claims are all wrong. In passing, the instrumentalist thesis is distinguished from other, unrelated, views sometimes associated with instrumentalism, including Brian Tamanaha's diagnosis of the vices of American law, and the views of those who think that jurisprudence is an instrument in the service of social ends

2009-12-14T00:00:00Z